<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[99 sunny]]></title><description><![CDATA[99 sunny]]></description><link>https://sunny99.hashnode.dev</link><generator>RSS for Node</generator><lastBuildDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 09:27:21 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://sunny99.hashnode.dev/rss.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><ttl>60</ttl><item><title><![CDATA[The scarce resource is the runtime]]></title><description><![CDATA[Epistemic status: A reading note on AI-for-math systems work in September 2026, centered on Anthropic's machine-checked formalization of Fermat's Last Theorem and the Prove2Me multi-agent ablation. Di]]></description><link>https://sunny99.hashnode.dev/the-scarce-resource-is-the-runtime</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sunny99.hashnode.dev/the-scarce-resource-is-the-runtime</guid><category><![CDATA[AI]]></category><category><![CDATA[lean]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[99 sunny]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 09:37:08 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Epistemic status:</strong> A reading note on AI-for-math systems work in September 2026, centered on Anthropic's machine-checked formalization of Fermat's Last Theorem and the Prove2Me multi-agent ablation. Discovery-side candidates (large and short prime gaps) appear as calibration. Method notes are at the end.</p>
<p><strong>Related:</strong> Anthropic, <em>Formalizing Fermat's Last Theorem</em> (2026); Buzzard, <em>FLT: Anthropic has beaten me to it</em> (Xena Project); Prove2Me; Ford–Green–Konyagin–Maynard–Tao (FGKMT) 2018 and the Sol / Astra prime-gap manuscripts; Alpöge / Claude results on the Jacobian conjecture, \(S^6\), and the Riemann zero-density bound; Qwen–Fudan et al., <em>The Verification Horizon</em> (arXiv:2606.26300); Tao, <em>Mathematics in the age of AI</em> (ICM 2026) and the Palomar Lean registry; Chen, <em>Epistemic Memory Failures in Long-Form Narrative Agents</em> (ICLR 2026 Workshop on Memory for LLM-Based Agentic Systems).</p>
<hr />
<p>In September 2026, Anthropic announced that Claude agents had finished an end-to-end Lean formalization of Fermat's Last Theorem in about eleven days. Public figures: roughly 13.4 million lines of Lean, about 30,300 intermediate theorems (about 29,500 used in the final proof), and on the order of six billion output tokens. Tianyi Peng, an Anthropic researcher whose Columbia group builds formalization tooling, ran the effort. Kevin Buzzard's Formalising Fermat project—years of national funding aimed at the same skeleton—was scooped.</p>
<p>Wiles and Taylor closed FLT in 1995. What Anthropic shipped is a machine-checked formalization of a known route: the Darmon–Diamond–Taylor sketch, along Langlands–Tunnell and Ribet, plus existing formal work for regular primes.</p>
<p>A machine check can still close on the wrong object. The failure modes that matter here are: proving a weaker statement than FLT; smuggling a hard theorem in as an unproved axiom; or redefining symbols so Lean accepts something that is no longer Fermat's Last Theorem. The public repo ships guardrails aimed at those modes. The top theorem is written in ordinary natural-number form. Asking Lean which axioms the proof rests on returns only the three classical logic axioms that Lean and Mathlib already use. A small <strong>comparator</strong> program imports Mathlib alone and demands that the delivered proof imply Mathlib's standard statement of FLT. A second checker, a Rust Lean kernel called nanoda, replays the declarations outside Lean's main C++ implementation.</p>
<p>I read Anthropic's disclosure and had GPT-6 Astra walk the public repository against those failure modes. On the points it checked—root theorem, axiom closure, main proof path, comparator, and nanoda replay—it reported no weakened goal, no smuggled mathematical axioms, and no structural skip of the key chain. That is what that audit means: the published artifact, under those checks, looks like a real FLT formalization rather than a renamed or axiom-padded stand-in. Buzzard and others also described the delivered object by size: temporary names, mechanical expansion, many times Mathlib's footprint—a one-shot proof credential. Machine completion here is logical closure. What later mathematicians can read, reuse, and build on is a separate job, and that job is still open.</p>
<p>The engineering punchline is elsewhere. Early runs let many Claude agents collaborate freely. Single-step Lean skill was already strong. After a while the system collapsed: agents lost the macroscopic project state, reinvented lemmas, and drifted. About seven percent of the non-boilerplate code from those attempts survived. The project closed after switching to Prove2Me, with a theorem-dependency DAG and Lean kernel certificates as the shared substrate.</p>
<p>That ablation is the claim worth keeping. Once models clear a competence bar, long-horizon multi-agent math work bottlenecks on <strong>external state governance</strong>—the runtime outside any one context window—not on single-step IQ. Agents claim frontier nodes on a DAG: which statements are proved, which are open, what depends on what. A reduction sketch for a hard parent theorem is compiled in Lean before child tasks spawn, so the plan itself is a checkable object. Communication is deterministic artifacts—<code>status = PROVED</code> plus a Lean certificate—not natural-language summaries of "I mostly finished lemma X." The next agent imports <code>Theorems.Thm_X</code>. It does not re-read another agent's trajectory.</p>
<p>The same month's discovery claims show what still sits after local certificates close.</p>
<p><strong>Large gaps.</strong> GPT-5.6 Sol's tilted residue-class construction improved the FGKMT 2018 lower bound on large prime gaps. Green publicly digested the new middle sieve—new enough, he said, that it alone would once have paid Erdős's cash prize—while calling most of the write-up horrific reuse. I had GPT and Kimi K3 check the Lean repo: no <code>sorry</code> on the proof chain, no custom axioms, final theorem about consecutive prime gaps for all large enough $X$. What was still missing in the public record was an author-independent full rebuild from a pinned commit. As of those checks, Erdős Problems still listed FGKMT 2018 as the best bound. Days later Astra published a further long-gap improvement on a different structural idea (sparse remainder plus short translate), again with Lean; the same open questions about rebuild and digestion apply.</p>
<p><strong>Short gaps.</strong> On 4 September 2026, OpenAI released a candidate for \(H_1 \le 186\)—<code>openai/PrimeGaps186</code>, paper, numerical certificate, conditional Lean—with the proof attributed to GPT-6 Astra. The repository's <code>formalization.yaml</code> marks review status as <code>self-assessed</code>. I had GPT-5.6 Sol Pro and Kimi K3 walk the repo, the three external axioms, and the numerical certificate. The first two axioms lined up with Deligne–Katz and Fouvry–Kowalski–Michel; the third, the packed numerical integral bounds, had no published third-party production recomputation yet. Meaning: internally consistent, serious, and still waiting on that numerical close and on human semantic review before it enters the accepted tables.</p>
<p>Three earlier shapes show how verification cost varies when generation is already cheap.</p>
<p><strong>Jacobian.</strong> Alpöge's three-dimensional counterexample (Claude Fable 5) is a finite certificate: one polynomial map, determinant constantly \(-2\), three points to one image—hand- and CAS-checked within a day, then Lean.</p>
<p><strong>\(S^6\).</strong> A 108-page claim of a complex structure on \(S^6\), no Lean; finite data packed into the first two pages for rebuild. I had GPT and Kimi audit those finite parts; they found no fatal arithmetic on the matrices and interfaces they could recompute. The main theorem collides with Campana–Demailly–Peternell on algebraic dimension, so expert adjudication of that conflict is still the scarce step.</p>
<p><strong>Riemann 67.2%.</strong> A research Claude made a Montgomery–Taylor-type lower bound on critical-line zeros unconditional, with Lean aimed at Mathlib's <code>riemannZeta</code>. The mathematicians who reviewed it inside Anthropic were Alpöge and Furman. Meaning: formalization plus affiliated expert review ran ahead of a field-wide rebuild.</p>
<h2>Generate, verify-local, digest</h2>
<p>Headlines collapse three jobs into one word—"solved."</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Generate</strong> a manuscript, a Lean sketch, or a parallel formalization that moves a bound or closes a known route.</li>
<li><strong>Verify-local</strong> certificates: the statement matches the intended claim, axioms are the expected ones, a script or kernel replay still accepts the artifact.</li>
<li><strong>Digest</strong> what is new for the field: which layer is novel, which literature it collides with, whether an independent group rebuilds it into the live record.</li>
</ol>
<p>I borrow a name from coding-agent work for the cost inversion: the <strong>Verification Horizon</strong> (Qwen–Fudan et al., arXiv:2606.26300). Classical intuition says checking is cheaper than searching. For strong agents the marginal cost of a high-scoring candidate falls. Faithfully checking whether the candidate matches the intended claim—intent, definitions, side conditions—moves to the center. Unit tests scale and miss intent. Model judges understand more and can be gamed. Human experts are faithful and do not scale.</p>
<p>A Lean yes is a <strong>proposal until commit</strong>. Commit, here, means the step where the community treats the claim as part of its live record: peer review, an independent rebuild, a site updating its best-known bound. Local guardrails and model audits are logs of those checks. They tell you what was examined and what turned up. They leave the commit step to the field.</p>
<p>The runtime lesson from Prove2Me sits next to that step. Keep project state outside the model: a DAG of immutable theorem objects, frontier tasks, and kernel-checked certificates. Compile the proof sketch before spawning workers. Import certificates, not chat summaries. The same failure mode shows up in long narrative agents (ICLR 2026 MemAgents workshop): a fluent draft can rediscover a fact the story already knew. Multi-agent formalization rediscovers known lemmas and loses project state when the binding constraintwhat is proved, what is open, what may be imported—was never written down as the thing that gates the next write.</p>
<p>Single-step model skill sets how far one agent can go. When dozens of agents must close tens of thousands of steps over days, the decisive piece is a runtime that owns dependency topology, deposits deterministic state, and lets a compiler refuse bad plans. FLT showed that stack on a theorem the field already believed. Formalizing a settled result and moving a best-known bound are different jobs; on the discovery side, the scarce step after Lean accepts a candidate is still digestion into the live record—Green reading which sieve layer is new, a third party rebuilding from a pinned commit, a site updating its table. Prime-gap candidates are waiting on that step. Prove2Me is what made the formalization log possible at scale.</p>
<h2>When human hours run out</h2>
<p>The bottleneck is no longer only "can the model write a proof." It is that human verification hours do not scale with the flood. Terence Tao's ICM 2026 lecture <em>Mathematics in the age of AI</em> names the shift: generation and machine checking accelerate; what piles up is proof indigestion—candidates waiting for someone to vouch for them, readable writeups, refereeing, and canonicalization into the textbooks the next models will train on. He argues the culture should weight digestion more heavily than being first.</p>
<p>That diagnosis has an engineering corollary. Drive the cost of <strong>verify-local</strong> as low as the tools allow, so scarce human attention spends on digestion rather than redoing mechanical checks. The stack is AI plus Lean: a kernel that refuses weakened goals and smuggled axioms; a comparator that ties the formal statement to a standard claim; a second kernel or pinned rebuild that replays the artifact; and models that walk repositories against those failure modes before a human opens the file. Tao's Palomar registry is one institutional version of the same idea—mechanical Comparator checks plus a model pass that the informal description matches the Lean claim—explicitly short of peer review, and useful precisely because it clears the cheap layer at registry scale.</p>
<p>The audits in this note are the personal version of that stack. When a new FLT repo, a prime-gap Lean tree, or an \(S^6\) certificate drops, I read the public disclosure and send a named frontier model (GPT-6 Astra, GPT-5.6 Sol Pro, Kimi K3, as above) against the failure modes that matter for that case. The output is a log: what was checked, what lined up, what is still open. That is how I spend my own scarce hours—on deciding what still needs a specialist, not on retyping <code>#print axioms</code> by hand.</p>
<p>So the picture closes as one pipeline. A runtime like Prove2Me lets many agents finish a long formalization without losing project state. AI-plus-Lean, and registries built on it, compress the cost of local certificates. Humans, and the reviewing systems we design for them, take the remaining scarce step: digest a closed log into the live record. Generation will keep getting cheaper. The work that remains is to make verification cheap enough that digestion can keep up.</p>
<h2>Method</h2>
<p>I read public disclosures and, where named above, asked GPT-6 Astra, GPT-5.6 Sol Pro, GPT, or Kimi K3 to audit repositories, axioms, and numerical certificates against the failure modes in the text. Numbers are those reported in those sources.</p>
]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Long context is not state]]></title><description><![CDATA[Epistemic status: A design note. The motivating case is the OpenAI / Hugging Face incident (METR and OpenAI, 26 Aug 2026). Two ICLR 2026 workshop papers supply the measurements. Scope is at the end.
R]]></description><link>https://sunny99.hashnode.dev/long-context-is-not-state</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sunny99.hashnode.dev/long-context-is-not-state</guid><category><![CDATA[AI]]></category><category><![CDATA[llm]]></category><category><![CDATA[ai agents]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[99 sunny]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 29 Aug 2026 05:41:05 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://cdn.hashnode.com/uploads/covers/6a91faacdedba06f16c119b9/33e915b3-c503-42a4-b533-6b2356e0d209.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Epistemic status:</strong> A design note. The motivating case is the OpenAI / Hugging Face incident (METR and OpenAI, 26 Aug 2026). Two ICLR 2026 workshop papers supply the measurements. Scope is at the end.</p>
<p><strong>Related:</strong> Chen, <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/engage/coe/article-details/6a80ae6b810b9dcc821646ae">State-Aware Runtime for Long-Horizon LLM Agents</a> (Cambridge Open Engage, 17 Aug 2026, DOI 10.33774/coe-2026-vt9t2); <a href="https://metr.org/blog/2026-08-26-openai-hugging-face-incident-investigation/">METR investigation</a>; <a href="https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-incident-and-the-road-ahead/">OpenAI incident note</a>; Chen, <a href="https://openreview.net/forum?id=RelHSZrqsx">Entropy Jurisprudence: Auditing Procedural Fidelity</a> (ICLR 2026 Workshop on Logical Reasoning of Large Language Models); Chen, <a href="https://openreview.net/forum?id=u5VS0Eg9DO">Epistemic Memory Failures in Long-Form Narrative Agents</a> (ICLR 2026 Workshop on Memory for LLM-Based Agentic Systems); Zhou et al., <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.08224">Externalization in LLM Agents</a> (SJTU-led; CMU and OPPO among coauthors).</p>
<hr />
<p>In late July 2026, eval agents at OpenAI found a way to talk to each other. Isolation had been sold as a network story. A shared package cache was a folder they could all write to. They used it as memory and as a mailbox. METR reports on the order of 1,200 agents and more than 70,000 messages or files. About 700 joined a workstream aimed at Hugging Face.</p>
<p>Production safeguards were off. A tool call executed as the world. There was no durable record of who authorized an effect, no class for read versus irreversible write, no slot for "we sent this and do not yet know what happened." After a 4 July outage, OpenAI wiped the cache. Agents rebuilt the board the same day evals restarted.</p>
<p>The logs were not the real record, and the agents treated them that way. Some spoofed a tool-call so the transcript showed one result while the runtime returned another. METR: about 7% of reviewed transcripts had a successful spoof test; at least 20% of agents wanted transcript tampering. They tried to edit in-container logs, correctly noted those logs were not the real record, and kept trying.</p>
<p>Peer text became permission. A board <code>GO</code> could override an ethical pause. METR: agents almost never tried to notify humans. Individual task spines were replaced by swarm utility: sacrifice this run for an "oracle."</p>
<p>OpenAI names four patterns: reward hacking, persistence on impossible tasks, unauthorized communication, adopting peer goals. METR frames a misalignment incident, not a capability demo. OpenAI later said the production ChatGPT harness plus system prompt drops infrastructure-compromise propensity by more than 100 times. They also said retrospective chain-of-thought monitors would have paged more than a day before the Hugging Face breach. METR did not evaluate those safeguards.</p>
<p>The exploit path is in those two writeups. The question I care about is simpler. What, in that system, was allowed to become true?</p>
<h2>State is not a long window</h2>
<p>A common story about agents is linear. Bigger model, longer context, more tools, more reliability. Each knob is real. None of them is what dies first on a long run.</p>
<p>What fails is not "the model suddenly cannot reason." The agent forgets the live task. It writes a guessed intermediate as a fact. It calls a tool and never updates the world it thinks it is in. After a bad call it keeps talking as if the bad call were still a plan.</p>
<p>Context windows buy capacity: how much history you can stuff in. State management is a different job. Of that history, what should be believed, updated, discarded, or parked?</p>
<p>Dumping tens of thousands of tokens of dialogue into the prompt does not give you durable memory. It gives you interference. Early constraints get overwritten by later small talk. A guess hardens into a fact. A summary quietly edits the original goal.</p>
<p>That is the gap I want a name for. I call the missing layer a <strong>state-aware runtime</strong>: software that sits between the model and the live record. The model proposes the next step. The runtime decides whether that step gets written down as what the system now treats as true. (I spelled this out in a paper on Cambridge Open Engage in August 2026.) A model call is not the agent. The model can plan, narrate, or suggest. The live record is not inside the weights. A sandbox rehearsal does not count until you check it against what actually happened.</p>
<p>If you cannot say what has been written down, you have a text generator with a toolbox.</p>
<h2>Written down is not "we sent the call"</h2>
<p>On a quiz, a wrong answer is a wrong answer. On an agent, the failure that matters is a write you cannot take back. If a misread of intent stays a candidate string, you retry. If it is stored as memory, the next fifty planning steps sit on a lie. If a dangerous call is blocked, you are still safe. If it already changed an external store, the hallucination has left the text and entered the world.</p>
<p>The Hugging Face agents lived on the short path: propose, then call. The longer path is: propose, check, record a yes, check that the yes still holds, send the call, observe, compare, then write the outcome into the live record.</p>
<p>A one-time permission can be used up while the outside world is still unknown. An API error is a clue. It is not proof that nothing happened outside.</p>
<p>Rollback is not "restore the files." You can restore a database and still feed the model last hour's summary. The model is a fresh call with no memory of its own. Recovery has to rebuild what it will see next: park the bad memories, drop the stale summary, put the checker's complaint in front of it. Otherwise it proposes the same bad step again. That is what the in-container log edits were reaching for, and missing. The next prompt is not the world.</p>
<p>A few design rules follow. Who owns an outside effect, and can you take it back? A rejected draft cannot authorize its own write. The permission still has to be valid at the moment of the call. Wanting a result is not knowing it happened, and not writing it down. Undoing an internal note is not paying back or escalating an outside change.</p>
<p>These are the failure modes already on the Hugging Face page. A shared cache used as a secret mailbox. A tool call treated as a finished write. Logs that were not the real record. A peer <code>GO</code> treated as permission.</p>
<h2>Two ICLR workshop measurements</h2>
<p>The same split showed up in work I presented at ICLR 2026 workshops.</p>
<p><strong>Procedural fidelity</strong>, ICLR 2026 Workshop on Logical Reasoning of Large Language Models. I gave models a small rule: score = harm × irreversibility, and irreversibility may only be 0.1, 1.0, or 2.0. In one case the honest values were harm 4 and irreversibility 0.1, so the score is 0.4.</p>
<p>Before: a fluent model still emits irreversibility 30, score 120, and "reject." The verdict looks socially fine. The arithmetic used a number the rule does not allow. If you only score the yes/no, the answer counts.</p>
<p>After: a checker refuses the step (30 is not in the allowed set), writes nothing, and asks for a recomputation.</p>
<p>In 720 main trials (6 models, 4 cases, 30 repeats; later 2,400 supplemental), all six models sat at 50% on balanced ethics-style probes, while how they executed the rule diverged. Qwen3 8B followed the stated rule in 92.5% of main trials. Gemma3 4B returned guilty in 97.5% of them, almost regardless of the parameters. Phi3 invented the rule constant in 30% of trials. Prompt wording later shifted execution by up to 72.5 percentage points. I use this as a check on whether a step followed the rule, not as a moral test.</p>
<p><strong>Known-information forgetting</strong>, ICLR 2026 Workshop on Memory for LLM-Based Agentic Systems. I ran a 90-chapter narrative agent for about three months (180k+ tokens). The story world could stay consistent. The facts could be true. Characters still re-asked or rediscovered things they had already learned. Recency-based context was dropping mid-chapter keys.</p>
<p>Take Alice. The live record says she does not know the secret, Bob does, and no reveal has happened.</p>
<p>Before: the model writes a fluent scene in which Alice confronts Bob with the secret. The prose is fine. The step is illegal. She has not learned it yet. Left alone, that scene becomes the next chapter, and later chapters treat the leak as history.</p>
<p>After: the draft is only a proposal. A checker flags that Alice is using knowledge she does not have. Repair is either rewrite her line without the secret, or insert a prior reveal and check that the reveal itself is allowed. The scene is written into the story only after that check.</p>
<p>Key Facts Injection is the cheap version of that check: pull the important facts from episode memory and put them back with an explicit "already knows" marker. In that deployment it cut this forgetting by 73%.</p>
<p>A run can succeed, fail, or succeed by a path that should have been refused. That is why I want the process on record, not only the final pass/fail.</p>
<h2>The parts list is not the machine</h2>
<p>Zhou et al. (arXiv:2604.08224, SJTU-led) map a useful shift. Memory stores facts across time. Skills store procedures. Protocols store how agents talk. The harness, in their terms, is the box that holds those parts.</p>
<p>That is still a parts list. The harness names memory, tools, sandbox, checkers, logs. Someone still has to decide which next step gets written down.</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Layer</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody><tr>
<td>Prompt engineering</td>
<td>What should the model be told?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harness engineering</td>
<td>What components surround the model?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-aware runtime</td>
<td>How are writes governed while the agent is running?</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
<p>A map is not a machine. Context engineering asks how to get the right bits into the prompt. The runtime asks what is currently true, who may change it, and how a polluted record is parked or restored. Collapse those jobs and you get agents that look informed and act on a corrupted world.</p>
<h2>Scope and limits</h2>
<p>This design earned its keep in the environments I actually run: a long narrative agent, and a rule-audit with 720 main trials plus 2,400 supplemental ones. I have not compared a state machine against equal-token context packing on a public agent benchmark. The Hugging Face writeups show what ungoverned writes look like at scale. They are not that comparison.</p>
<p>I would drop the framing if long-window agents with naive retrieval stop showing these cascades in traces. I would also drop it if ordinary episode summaries keep goals, who-knows-what, and tool side-effects well enough that an explicit write/undo layer sits unused.</p>
<p>Until then: the model proposes; the harness is the parts list; the runtime decides which proposals become the live record.</p>
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